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NPS MDP Study Goals
• Coordinate NPS cross-campus efforts in an 
integrated study to analyze and design an 
integrated architecture for Maritime Domain 
Protection (MDP) in PACOM.
• “Design a conceptual system of systems to 
defeat and prevent terrorism in the Maritime 



































NPS MDP Study Tasking
MDP Group
“Design and assess integrated alternative 
architectures…for a coalition of nations, 
focusing on large ship security…in the Straits 
of Malacca.”
Total Maritime Inspection System (TMIS)
“Design and assess alternative architectures 
for cargo inspection to include a total ship 
inspection sub-system…to prevent the use of 
a large cargo ship as a terrorist vehicle.”
NPS MDP Study Considerations
Generic Solution
- Malacca Straits as “Use Case”




- Idealistic – “what could be possible”




- No more than 5 years out from IOC




“Technology component and/or basic technology 
subsystem validation in laboratory environment.”
NPS MDP Study Timeline: 
6 Months
Jul Jun













Nov 04 - Feb 05
Objectives Tree Phase
Apr 05 - May 05
Assembly Phase




Jul 04 - Oct 04
Preliminary Problem Study








Feb 05 - Apr 05
Modeling and Analysis Phase
6 months of focused study
PACOM Questions
In order to reduce the terrorist threat in the 
maritime domain:
• What is the most effective use of current 
resources?
• Where should resources be focused for 
the most future cost-effectiveness?
Terrorism and Piracy 





– 59,314 Ships per year (2001)
• 20,665 Tankers
• 3,086 LNG tankers
• Average 162 ships per day
– 30% of World trade
• $28.4 trillion USD per day (2003)
Port of Singapore
– 133,385 ship arrivals per year (2004)
Piracy Increasing Against 
Commercial Shipping
Source: IMO
Terrorism vs. Commercial Shipping
• OCT 2001- Gioia, Italy – Illegal cargo (stowaway) found
– Well-equipped container (bed, toilet, heater, water, laptop, sat-phone)
– Airport security passes for JFK, Newark, LAX, O’Hare
• OCT 2002 – Gulf of Aden, Yemen – Small Boat Attack
– French crude oil tanker Limburg
– Small fast craft with 2 crew and 2500 lbs TNT
– Impact pierced both hulls and 8m of cargo hold
– Lost crude oil from number 4 starboard tank
– $45M damage cost
• MAR 2003 – Strait of Malacca – Ship As Weapon(?)
– Chemical tanker Dewi Madrim
– 0300: Boarded by 10 pirates via speedboat
– Disabled radio, steered vessel, altering speed, for ~1hour
– Departed with Captain and First Mate (still missing)
Maritime Domain Protection Efforts
• U.S. Lead Agencies
– U.S. Coast Guard (CONUS)
– U.S. Navy (International)
• Over 100 Initiatives











- Detect surface contacts





- Receive external source data 
- Request internal & external 
data
- Correlate tracks
- ID anomalies/suspect 
behavior
- Relay track ID to C2 
Regional C2:
- Receive track handoffs
- Monitor tracks
- Provide traffic advisories
- Pass track to regional or 
local C2
Local C2:
- Control port operations
- Inspect cargo
- Deploy response forces




























3) Force Response System
4) Sea Inspection System




Threat to/from Large Ships:
• Small Boat Attack
- Gun/RPG attack
- Missile attack
- Suicide/remote control 
explosives
• Hostile Boarding/ 
Stowaway/Intentional
- Hostage taking
- Onload CBRNE weapon
- Ship as weapon (vs. port or 
ship)
- Scuttle ship in port/channel




- In bulk cargo
• Outside of Cargo
- Inside ship hold
- Outside hold above 
waterline
- Outside hold below waterline
#1 “Small Boat Attack”
(SBA)
#2 “Ship as Weapon”
(SAW)












Ship As Weapon (SAW)
MDP Top-Level 
System Requirements
Small Boat Attack (SBA)
• Probable – Demonstrated
• Defeat 80%
Other
• 24/7 – all weather
• System must be interoperable with external systems
• Daily System Operational Availability ≥ 0.9
*Defeat = Less than $100k damage
*Confidence Interval = 95%
Ship As Weapon (SAW)
• Probable – Proven capability
• Defeat 90%
WMD - Nuclear
• Remote – Unlikely, but possible
• Defeat 60%
Engage – 250mNeutralize – NLT 35m
Objective: Neutralize SBA >65m from Large Ship
Threshold: Neutralize SBA >35m from Large Ship
Small Boat Attack Scenario
Engage – 2,000m
Neutralize – NLT 50m
Ship As Weapon Scenario
Objective: Neutralize SAW >500m from pier
Threshold: Neutralize SAW >50m from pier
Stop > 850m
WMD Scenario
Objective: Stop CBRN material >1000m from port
Threshold: Stop CBRN material >850m from port
MDP Top-Level System Objectives
Small Boat Attack 
(SBA)
Identify Hostile Intent with 90% accuracy
Engage SBA by 250m from target
Neutralize SBA by 65m from target
Ship As Weapon 
(SAW)
Identify 99% of high-risk SAW threats (Hazardous Cargo)
Identify SAW attack with 95% accuracy
Engage SAW by 2000m from pier
Neutralize SAW by 500m from pier
WMD Detect CBRN material prior to Critical Area
• Evaluate System Impact on Commercial Shipping
• Evaluate MDP System Cost
• Evaluate Expected Attack Damage Cost










Small Boat Attack** 0.8 – 3.6 ~0% 80%
Ship As Weapon** 2.5 – 4.9 ~80% 90%
WMD 180 – 220 ~5% 60%
* Damage Cost includes: Structural repair, environmental cleanup, loss of life, lost commerce
** Target assumed to be oil tanker.
Simulation and Modeling
Overall Architecture MOEs
• MOE 1 - Performance
– Does the system architecture defeat each 
threat scenario with the required probability? 
• MOE 2 – Risk (Expected attack damage)
– What is the expected attack damage cost for 
each threat scenario?
Overall Architecture Metrics
• Metric 1 - Commercial Impact
– What is the expected cost to commerce over 10 years 
(through 2016)? 
• Commercial System Procurement Costs 
• Commercial System Operating & Support Costs
• Commercial Delay Costs
• Metric 2 – MDP System Cost
– What is the expected MDP system cost over 10 years 
(through 2016)?
• MDP System Procurement Costs

























































































Final Results To Be Presented
1 JUN 05
